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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
of the courts have departed from this general rule where the insured feloni-
ously causes the death of the beneficiary.9 J. W. M.
CONTRACr-NEGLI1GNCE AS A BAR TG EQurrABLE RELIE.-Appellant and
appellee entered into a written agreement whereby the appellant agreed to
purchase automobile accessories from the appellee. At the time of the execu-
tion of the instrument appellee's agent, in response to an inquiry, stated that-
the contract as written contained a provision to the effect that upon the
termination of the agreement the appellant could at his option pay such
sums as were due either in cash or by return of certain merchandise. In
reliance thereon, the appellant signed the instrument without reading it only
to discover subsequently that the provision had been omitted. After the rightful
termination of the contractual relations by the appellant, the appellee brought
suit for the sum owing. The court below excluded evidence of the misrepre-
sentations which appellant offered, apparently for the purpose of securing
reformation of the agreement. Held, on appeal, affirmed. The appellant's
negligence barred equitable relief.1
This case presents the intriguing question as to the right to equitable relief
of one who has signed an instrument without reading it. At present there are
two lines of authority,2 some courts taking the view that in the absence of
some clear excuse such as incapacity, the existence of a fiduciary relation, or
the like, it is inexcusable negligence so to sign without reading and equitable
relief will not be granted.3 On the other hand, many liberal jurisdictions
have held that signing a contract without reading it is not as a matter of law
such negligence as to preclude reformation; to have that effect the circum-
stances must show gross negligence. 4
While this split of authority does in fact exist as to the mere signing of an
instrument without reading it, a totally different question is presented when
one is induced to sign such a contract by the misrepresentations of the other
contracting party. In the case at bar, the court's opinion was predicated on
the fact that the appellant negligently refused to avail himself of the knowl-
edge at hand; therefore, he was not entitled to relief. It is submitted, how-
ever, that while this statement of the law might be true in a situation in
which there was no misrepresensation as to the contents of an agreement, it
certainly is not true when this other element is present. Such a result in the
latter event would be contrary to the great weight of authority, which is to
the effect that negligence constitutes no bar to reformation for the mistake of
9 Parker v. Potter (1931), 200 N. C. 348, 157 S. E. 68; Riggs v. Palmer(1889), 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188; New York Mutual v. Armstrong (1885),
117 U. S. 591, 6 S. Ct. 877.
Contra, Metropolitan Life v. May (1929), 10 Tenn. App. 221.
1 Welsh v. Kelly Springfield Tire Co. (Ind., 1938), 12 N. E. (2nd) 254.
245 A. L. R. 706.
3Keains v. Hart (1924-, D. C.), 1 F. (2nd) 318; Houchin v. Auracher
(1922), 194 Ia. 606, 190 N. W. 3, 45 A. L. R. 707.
4 Schautz v. Keener (1882), 87 Ind. 258; Smelser v. Pugh (1902), 29 Ind.
App. 614, 64 N. E. 943; Albany City Say. Bank v. Burdick (1881), 87 N. Y.
40; 45 A. L. R. 707.
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one party induced by the conscious misrepresentation of the other party.5 In
short, when actual fraudulent misrepresentations have been made, equitable,
relief in the form of rescission or reformation of the integration will be
granted despite the fact that the mistake resulted in part from the lack of due
care of the other party.6
In the situation presented, the element of fraud might well be found to
exist, since one is conclusively presumed to know the terms of the writing he
prepared and presented. 7 And when one definitely represents to the other
contracting party that it contains certain provisions which it does not, thereby
inducing' the other to contract without investigation, inferences as to fraudulent
intent might be drawn. 8 But even if such could not be established, surely
relief should be granted, since failure to investigate the truth of even an
honest misrepresentation is generally held to be no bar to relief.9
Thus, it would seem that the Indiana court ignored the significant features
of the case, and was content with saying that in the absence of a fiduciary
relationship the appellant's negligence barred all relief. In so proceeding this
state has taken a view definitely out of step with the modern and liberal
views.1 0  F. L. M.
5 McNair v. Public Say. Ins. Co. of America (1928), 88 Ind. App. 389,
163 N. E. 290; Fiorito v. Clyde Equip. Co. (1924), 2 F. (2nd) 807; and parol
evidence is admissible to show fraud: Tribune Co. v. Red Ball Transit Co.
(1926), 84 Ind. App. 666, 151 N. E. 338.
6 Note 5, supra; Given v. Masterson (1898), 152 Ind. 127, 51 N. E. 237;
Keller v. The Equitable Fire Ins. Co. (1867), 28 Ind. 170. However, if
rescission is attempted, the question as to restoring the defrauding party to
status quo might arise since the appellant has already used some of the goods.
The following cases have held that restitution in specie is not necessary, if the
nature of the transaction makes it impractical. Clark v. Wells (1914), 127
Minn. 353, L. R. A. 1916 F. 476, 149 N. W. 54-7; 6 R. C. L. 938.
7 Fiorito v. Clyde Equip. Co., note 5, supra.
8 McNair v. Public Say. Ins. Co. of America, note 5, supra.
9Wilks v. McGovern Place Oil Co. (1926), 189 Wis. 420, 207 N. W. 692;
Redgrave v. Hurd Ct. of Appeals, (1881), L. R. 20 Ch. Div. 1.
10 6 R. C. L. 633-34; Page, On Contracts (1919-1929 Suppl.) sec. 2219.
